The Most Dangerous Man in the World
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Ali Khamenei
AUG 20, 2012, VOL. 17, NO. 45 • BY REUEL MARC GERECHT
One of the startling cultural disconnects in studying Iran is how unimpressive
the officials of the Islamic Republic usually are. Reading Persian history
inclines one to expect Iranians to be highly cultured and nuanced, delicately
balanced between a conservative religious faith and a love of refinement
and pleasure. Remember the Persian vizier to the Turkish Seljuk sultans,
the eleventh-century Nizam al-Mulk, whose “mirror for princes” is a forerunner
to Machiavelli’s reflections on power.
Or the sixteenth-century Shah Abbas the Great and his astonishing, often
inebriated, court in Isfahan, which solidified Persian as the lingua franca among
Muslim elites. Or even, in more mundane, modern times, Amir Asadollah Alam,
a minister to both Pahlavi shahs, with his enormous capacity to marry tradition
to modernity, a skill that his last boss sorely lacked. But the days of such
accomplished men are long gone. Iran’s ruling class today is incapable of
attracting the country’s best and brightest. In their place have risen corrupt and
crude ideologues, who have made Iranian society, even for the devout, often
unpleasant and embarrassing. And what happens internally works its way abroad.
the officials of the Islamic Republic usually are. Reading Persian history
inclines one to expect Iranians to be highly cultured and nuanced, delicately
balanced between a conservative religious faith and a love of refinement
and pleasure. Remember the Persian vizier to the Turkish Seljuk sultans,
the eleventh-century Nizam al-Mulk, whose “mirror for princes” is a forerunner
to Machiavelli’s reflections on power.
Or the sixteenth-century Shah Abbas the Great and his astonishing, often
inebriated, court in Isfahan, which solidified Persian as the lingua franca among
Muslim elites. Or even, in more mundane, modern times, Amir Asadollah Alam,
a minister to both Pahlavi shahs, with his enormous capacity to marry tradition
to modernity, a skill that his last boss sorely lacked. But the days of such
accomplished men are long gone. Iran’s ruling class today is incapable of
attracting the country’s best and brightest. In their place have risen corrupt and
crude ideologues, who have made Iranian society, even for the devout, often
unpleasant and embarrassing. And what happens internally works its way abroad.
ALI KHAMENEI
NEWSCOM
Although the Islamic Republic is
moving ever closer to obtaining a
nuclear weapon, the ruling caste
—Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
in particular—has not been adroit
in advancing the cause. Western
indecision, timidity, and greed rather
than Iranian diplomatic skill and strategic
acumen have permitted the steady
progress of the nuclear program. If the
supreme leader had more Persian
wiliness, Tehran would surely get its
nuke with far less damage to the economy
than it is suffering. The possibility of an
American or Israeli preemptive strike would
be far more remote. The odds that Khamenei’s aggressive, small-minded faith would
lead his country into a war with Israel and the United States would be much lower
than they are.
moving ever closer to obtaining a
nuclear weapon, the ruling caste
—Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
in particular—has not been adroit
in advancing the cause. Western
indecision, timidity, and greed rather
than Iranian diplomatic skill and strategic
acumen have permitted the steady
progress of the nuclear program. If the
supreme leader had more Persian
wiliness, Tehran would surely get its
nuke with far less damage to the economy
than it is suffering. The possibility of an
American or Israeli preemptive strike would
be far more remote. The odds that Khamenei’s aggressive, small-minded faith would
lead his country into a war with Israel and the United States would be much lower
than they are.
The Islamic Republic’s most powerful figures seem incapable of escaping their
revolutionary religious identities and acknowledging their own rich culture, let alone
the Western, mostly Marxist, ideas that have so profoundly shaped them.
Read Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, on Western philosophy,
a subject in which he reportedly got a Ph.D., and marvel at the contortion of his
thinking, at the inferiority complex that makes a good mind seem stupid. A close
confidant of the supreme leader, a former nuclear negotiator and commander in
the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Larijani is incapable of playful conversation with
non-Muslims—something that comes easily to your average Persian Muslim.
Instrumental in crushing Iran’s liberal intellectual efflorescence in the 1990s,
Larijani is not unique: The revolutionary elite today has an enormously difficult
time so much as saying “hello” to those who have not sprung from its world.
revolutionary religious identities and acknowledging their own rich culture, let alone
the Western, mostly Marxist, ideas that have so profoundly shaped them.
Read Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, on Western philosophy,
a subject in which he reportedly got a Ph.D., and marvel at the contortion of his
thinking, at the inferiority complex that makes a good mind seem stupid. A close
confidant of the supreme leader, a former nuclear negotiator and commander in
the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Larijani is incapable of playful conversation with
non-Muslims—something that comes easily to your average Persian Muslim.
Instrumental in crushing Iran’s liberal intellectual efflorescence in the 1990s,
Larijani is not unique: The revolutionary elite today has an enormously difficult
time so much as saying “hello” to those who have not sprung from its world.
The Iranian regime really should have been able to outplay the West in the
recent P5+1 nuclear meetings in Istanbul, Baghdad, and Moscow. Contrary to
what is sometimes written on the American right, they manifestly did not. The
Europeans and the Americans held firm, though they wanted to deal. Even more
than President Barack Obama, the Europeans want to avoid an Israeli preemptive
strike. In the White House and in Europe, there is little appetite for more
impoverishing sanctions. All would prefer to stop, if the Iranians would only
adhere—perhaps just pretend to adhere—to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which Iran signed and ratified in 1970 and which actually allows a lot of
maneuvering room for a nuke-seeking deceitful state.
recent P5+1 nuclear meetings in Istanbul, Baghdad, and Moscow. Contrary to
what is sometimes written on the American right, they manifestly did not. The
Europeans and the Americans held firm, though they wanted to deal. Even more
than President Barack Obama, the Europeans want to avoid an Israeli preemptive
strike. In the White House and in Europe, there is little appetite for more
impoverishing sanctions. All would prefer to stop, if the Iranians would only
adhere—perhaps just pretend to adhere—to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which Iran signed and ratified in 1970 and which actually allows a lot of
maneuvering room for a nuke-seeking deceitful state.
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